The second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why "cause" has to be an a priori concept [I] A segunda analogia e a resposta kantiana a Hume: por que "causa" tem que ser um conceito a priori 
THNǰȱŗǯřǯřȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ more general about causality: "¢ȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ¢"; we read in its title. In this section, Hume defends that the proposition " ȱ ȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡" "is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŜǼǯȱȱȱ-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŜǼǯȱȱȱ cases we can solve the problem by applying the principle of non-contradiction, that is, there is a relation of ideas when the contradictory proposition is self-contradictory.
This being so, one should demonstrate "the impossibility there is, that anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principle"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŜǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ necessary. At this point, Hume applies an important principle of his philosophy so that he can prove it is not impossible to separate the idea of a new existence from the idea of cause. That very simple principle says that: "all distinct ideas are separable from each other" (HUME, ŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŜǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ-ceive as distinct from anything else may exist without anything else. The idea of a new existence is not distinct from the idea of a previous time when the thing was not existent, but it is distinct from the idea of ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ the idea of a cause to the idea of a new existence in order to conceive or imagine it, they are distinct ideas, therefore, "it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŜǼǯ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ -ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ-ry principle in a logical or metaphysical point of view. In fact, Hume ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ"the necessity of a cause to every new production"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŞǼǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ usual, to explain how that belief would arise from experience instead of suggesting we should not hold such a belief. Nevertheless, at the end of the section 1.3.3, Hume does not believe to be able to answer how we derive our opinion about the principle of "every-event-some-cause" ȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ question in another one: "¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱěǰȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǵ" in order to see if "the same answer will serve for both questions"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱśŞǼǯȱ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-ticular causal relations and our causal inferences with an account of our belief in the general principle of causality. The following passage might be understood this way 2 ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ not be. I quote it in full:
We may now be able fully to overcome all that repugnance, which it is so natural for us to entertain against the foregoing reasoning, by which we endeavoured to prove, that the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęǯȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱĴ; we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǲȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡-ry and incomprehensible; nor can we be certain of its reality, but from ¡ȱȱȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŗśȬŗŗŜǼǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ's ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ of demonstration of the necessity of the principle of "every-event-some--cause"ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱę-nitions of causality by now. This time we are told that the idea of a new ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱ that, we are told that it is still easier to understand the point when we ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ "psychological" terms, that is, when that ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ existence determines the mind to form its idea. After all, we can conceive an event without conceiving that propensity of our mind. By conceiving causality in that way, Hume can say "that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity"ȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱ"any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive"ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ£ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ not "to show that we have no basis whatever -neither demonstrative ȱ¡ -for our belief in the general maxim that every event has a cause"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŞǰȱǯȱŞřǰȱȱǼǰȱȱ ¢ȱ¢ǯ ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ's text, Guyer defends that: "our particular causal beliefs are always based on repeated past experiences, and we obviously cannot have repeated past experiences of every sort of event we might ever encounter, or that we can ima-ȱ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ about every such event"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŞǰȱǯȱŞŚǼǯȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ distinction between the operation in particular causal inferences and the operation that would be necessary to explain our belief in the principle of "every-event-some-cause" 3 , in order to show that experience can give ȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ analyse Hume's account of particular causal inferences, that is, we should ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ From the quote of Guyer'ȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ"repeated past experiences"ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ's theory of particular causal inference. Before we reach that point, we should start by unders-ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱ in time and place, and "ȱȱ ȱȱ cause ȱȱȱ ȱȱě"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŖśǼǯȱǰȱ those are not the only relevant elements to the semantics of the concept of ¢ǯȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ is the essential content in that concept. However, the idea of necessary ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ's empiricist theory of meaning, we should accept that "causality" is an empty word or ¢ȱȱěȱȱǻȱ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŖşȬŗŗŖǼǯ
Hume's original solution to the problem of the empirical meaning of the concept of necessary connection is to replace the missing ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-ȱȱȱȱěȱ ȱȱ"psychological" impression in the obser-ǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǻȱ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŗŗǼǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ does Hume have in mind when he tells us necessity is only a feeling that an observation causes in us? This is the point where those "repeated past experiences"ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱěǯȱ But, on the other hand, if "we observe several instances, in which the ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱǲȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ a connection between them, and begin to draw an inference from one to another"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŗŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǵȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ-ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǼǱȱ"ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ nothing new in any of them"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗŗŖȬŗŗŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ give rise to the idea of necessary connection. It would be all about an ěȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ's mind.
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ when we perform a causal inference about a particular relation betwe-ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢'s thesis about the impossibility of an empirical answer to Hume's question about the principle of "every-event-some-cause". From what we have learned above, Adam ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ mean that Adam would need to observe a stone smashing Eve's head ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ each other. Well if that is a real Humean scenery then we do not need to have repeated past experiences of every sort of body "we might ever encounter, or that we can imagine existing" thus that we can have basis ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǯ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ be useful to account for our belief in the principle of "every-event-some-cause"ǯȱ¢ȱȱǱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ěȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱěȱȱȱǯȱȱěǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ reading in Hume'ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱ's account ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ: "If ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ-fectly new to us, and of whose constancy and coherence we have no experience, it is because the manner, in which they present themselves ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗřŞȬŗřşǼǯȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ-tant and coherent in order to ascribe continued existence to it, but since ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ existence to it. Maybe in the same way, we would not need to observe ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěǰȱ because, since it resembles other events that we have observed so far, ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱ of something else by analogy. If the reading above is correct, Guyer is ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǱȱ "there be no such thing as in the world…"ȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŖǰȱǯȱŗřŗǼǯ ǰȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ'ȱ ȱȱ Hume's 4 ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱ of Experience to be an ȱ proof of the principle of "every-event--some-cause" ś , something that Hume had thought to be impossible. In ǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱěȱ ȱȱȱǱ
The question [for Hume] was not, whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with respect to all cognition of nature, indispensable, for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather whether it is thought through reason ȱ, and in this way has an inner truth independent ȱȱ¡ǳȱǻ ǰȱŘŖŖŘǰȱǯȱśŜǼǯȱ To put it in other way, Kant seems to believe that, even though ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ proof of the principle of "every-event-some-cause" would worth the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 6 thus that he had to provide an ȱ proof for it.
After Hume'ȱȱ ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ available to Kant as for the principle of "every-event-some-cause": ei-ȱǼȱȱȱ ȱȱ'ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ of a demonstrative reasoning concerning the principle might be dismissed ŝ ǲȱȱǼȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ proof available to us. As everybody ǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ"every--event-some-cause" is one that Kant calls synthetic ȱ, it is in need of a proof strategy which would show the necessity of a proposition whose contradictory is not self-contradictory 8 ǯȱ ȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ 6 According to Kant, Hume "deposited his ship on the beach (of skepticism)" (KANT, I. (Prol). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science. Translated by Gary Hat eld. In: KANT, I. Theoretical philosophy after 1781. Edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 58). 7 In this context, we should keep in mind, a "demonstrative reasoning" is assumed to be an argument that proves a thesis by showing that its opposite involves a contradiction. 8 As everybody knows, Kant has believed that Hume had discovered the problem of synthetic a priori judgments, even though Hume would have believed a solution to that problem to be impossible: "how is it possible, asked the acute man, that when I am given one concept I can go beyond it and connect another one to it that is not contained in it, and can indeed do so, as though the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Only experience can provide us with such connections (so he concluded from this di culty, which he took for an impossibility) […]" (KANT, 2002, p. 74) . Allison argues that "Kant' s formulation of the issue in these terms is itself a paradigm case of reading another philosopher through distorting spectacles" (2008, p. 6) . That would be the case because Hume would not accept something like the analytic-synthetic distinction (which is a propositional distinction), since, according to Hume, a relation of ideas would be only the pre-judgmental apprehension of a connection between images or pictures of impressions. For Allison, Hume has a "perceptual model" of knowledge, that is completely di erent from the Kantian discursive model (see HUME, 2008, p. 6-10) . However, in spite of Hume' s notion of contradiction not being a strictly logical one (see BECK, 1978, p. 66) , the fact that Hume distinguishes between relations of ideas and matters of fact by saying that the opposite of a relation of ideas is a contradiction while the opposite of a matter of fact is not (see HUME, 2000, p. 56 and HUME, 1999, p. 108) . This ¢ǰȱ 's suggestion means that Kant is supposed to use a Humean ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯ
According to Kant, all the Analogies of Experience are ȱ con-ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǰȱǱȱ"Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱŘşśǼǯȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ's view, the principle of "every-event-some-cause" should be read as saying that an event ŗŖ , as a type of experience, is possible only through the representation of a cause, as a type of representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. This being so, cause would be an ȱ concept because it would hold necessarily for every event, since it would represent their necessary condition. But then, it is in order here to note that experience or empirical cognition for Kant, that is, "a cognition which determines an ȱȱ"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱŘşśǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ concept in Hume's philosophy named "belief", that is, "a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱŘşśǼǯȱȱěǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱǰȱȱ-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ succession implies the principle of "every-event-some-cause", at the best, ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-plies the belief in the principle of "every-event-some-cause" so that the belief in this principle would be another natural propension, but in no way it would be an ȱ principle. In Hume's view, a belief may be ȱȱ¢ȱ¢Ȧȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ ǰȱ ŘŖŖŖǰȱ ǯȱ ŜşȬŝŚǯǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of Humean thesis would have to be accounted for by the principle of "every-event-some-cause" as an ȱ principle without a gross distortion of Hume's philosophical commitments.
ǰȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱǻȱęȱ¢ȱȱ¡Ǳȱȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱȱǼ 11 , this paper is going to ȱ ȱ'ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ-ceded that there is experience of events thereby showing an ȱ argument that is not a demonstrative reasoning, a possibility that Hume does not seem to have considered. In other words, I intend to discover ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ possible only through the principle of "every-event-some-cause" read, against Hume, as an ȱ principle.
One is able to understand why any category plays its role in Kant'ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ unity of the manifold in the appearances. This amount to say that, for Kant, the manifold of appearances has no unity in itself, that is, unity is not a sensible data, but a product of an intellectual synthesis 12 . Hence, there will be universal validity in the product of the synthesis if and only if the rule of synthesis is universal and necessary, that is, if the rule is subsumed under an ȱ or pure concept of the understanding. ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ's solution to the problem of ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ǳȱ "what do I understand by the question, 11 It seems that the only way to prove that the Second Analogy would be (at least part of) a successful and complete answer to Hume would be by proving that the distinction between perceptions of objects and perceived objects is in itself a necessary condition for a Humean thesis. To sum up, it is my suggestion that Kant was in need to prove that empirical knowledge or knowledge of (instead of mere belief in) perceived objects as distinct from perceptions of them is a necessary condition for perceptions themselves. But then we should go far away from the Second Analogy. According to a long line of interpreters, to prove that point was exactly the goal of the Transcendental Deductions of the categories. 12 See, for example, Kant (1998, p. 211, 216 e 245) .
how the manifold may be combined [] in the appearance itself [ ȱ] (which is nothing in itself [ȱȱȱȱȱ selbst istǾǼǵ"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŜǼǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ meaning of the expression "appearance itself". If one does not unders-ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ succession that is not a succession in the thing in itself [ ȱȱȱȬ bst]. Kant is going to point out that it is in order here to understand the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ at the same time, distinct from mere apprehension. In other words, one must understand how a sum of representations can be considered as ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǵȱ ȱ ȱ what pure concepts are for, since a pure concept is the condition for a rule that "ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǽeine ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ]" (KANT, 1998, p. řŖŜǼǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ according to Kant's Copernican Revolution 13 . ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗǼȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǲȱ ŘǼȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǲȱ řǼȱ ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǲȱŚǼȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ-¢ǲȱśǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ a synthesis of the manifold. The conclusion would be that pure con-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱǱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ pure 13 See Kant, 1998, p. 309. In the Prolegomena, Kant takes the time to explain the relation between an empirical judgment and its object. According to him, when we give our judgments a relation to an object, we intend that those judgments "should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone else" (KANT, 2002: p. 92) . Kant is saying here that the relation to an object is in fact a relation among judgments of that object so that "if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another" (KANT, 2002, p. 92) . Because Kant takes objectivity and universality as being the same, he can say that whatever makes a judgment universally valid also de nes its relation to an object. Well, for Kant, universal validity is never grounded on perceptions, "but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed" (KANT, 2002, p. 92) . Kant also tells us: "judgments of experience will not derive their objective validity from the immediate cognition of the object (for this is impossible), but merely from the condition for the universal validity of empirical judgments, which […] never rests on empirical, or indeed sensory conditions at all, but on a pure concept of the understanding" (KANT, 2002, p. 93) .
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǵȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ęȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢Ǳȱ"Now let us proceed to our problem" ǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖşǼǯ ȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ conditions of empirical perception of an occurrence. According to Kant, an occurrence is never preceded by an empty time, but by an existence that does not contain that occurrence in itself. Thus, if it is conceded to Kant that one cannot perceive an empty time, it should be conceded that: "Every apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows another one"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŜǼǯȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ Kant is going to say that it is the case in any apprehension, that is, it is not only in the apprehension of an occurrence that a perception follows another one. That is why Kant is telling us it is in order here to investigate what is the case ¢ in perceptions of something that comes to be or ceases to be. This would be the fact that a perception preceding ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ a billiards table and a moving billiards ball. We can perceive the right ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǵȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ rest and then moving along the table. We will have a perception that follows another one. How do we decide that the ball's movement is something that comes to be after its rest?
Kant would say that we decide that the ball's movement is an ǰȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ 1 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 2 , ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 1 and the left cor-ȱ ȱ ȱ 2 , we would not have been able to perceive that ball's movement in t 1 and its rest in t 2 . At least, this is what Kant says: "I call the preceding state of perception and the following one B, then B can only follow in apprehension, but the perception cannot follow but only precede B"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŜȬřŖŝǼǯ On one hand, it seems safe to say that any perception that precedes another one cannot follow this one, since a perception itself is always a singular mental occurrence. On the other hand, we can perceive an occurrence of state preceding state B and then other occurrence in which state B precedes state ǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ's statement is by considering that, in perceptions of occurrences, it must be considered that one would not have been able to perceive in t 1 what was perceived in t 2 and vice-versa. That is ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ occurrences, and not as an empirical data or circumstance in perceptions of occurrences themselves 14 . If we agree with Kant'ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱ now what irreversibility in perception order has to do with causality. ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ-fortunately, Kant seems to say that successive order in perceptions is irreversible if the antecedent is cause of the consequent: "The concept […] that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the ȱȱȱȱě, the former of ȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ-mething that could merely precede in the imagination (or not even be ȱȱǼ"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖśǼǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ might understand that the irreversible succession of states in an occurrence that has to be accounted for is the same as succession between ȱ ȱ ěǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱěǯȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱǰȱ ȱ Kant would accept.
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱ ŗǼȱǰȱǲȱŘǼȱǯȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǵȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǻȱ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŜǼǰȱȱ's position downstream in t 1 is not the cause of ship's position upstream in t 2 , even though, for Kant, that order is irreversible. In fact, there are many examples in whi-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ and it would not be reasonable to dismiss those examples as improper ones. That is why, in spite of the passage quoted above, one cannot ex-ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǯ
Besides, it is very relevant to note here that, according to Kant, it ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǻ ǰȱ ŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŗŘǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ "in the instant in which ȱ ěȱ ęȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ its cause, since if the cause had ceased to be an instant before then the ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ "ȱ ǻ ǰȱ ŗşşŞǰȱ ǯȱ řŗŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ the Humean one. After all, Kant points out that "the law still holds" ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱěǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŗŘǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ one perceives in t 1 and something else that one perceives in t 2 . If one ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ-cause it is a condition for something else and not the other way around. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ-ȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ-tion for the second one. Thus we have to understand how their order can be irreversible while one state is not a condition for the other one. ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱěǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ. In principle, one could ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-termined, because a preceding occurrence produces it, that is, a succes-ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱǼȱȱ a succession of events with or without a lapse of time between them ǻȱȱěǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻȱǼǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ that. He is saying that an event follows the preceding one "ȱȱ ȱȱ"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŝǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ "general"ȱ ȱǻȱ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŗŗǼǯ
In the Jäsche , a rule is a "universal proposition, from which a particular cognition could be deduced"ȱǻ ǰȱŗşşŘǰȱǯȱŜŗŞǼǯȱ ¢ȱ applying that to the present context, we can say that Kant conceives ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢-ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ ¡-sing a universally valid sequence of events; while the minor premise Ĝȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǲȱȱȱ Ĝȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ¢ǰȱ¢ȱȱ relation between antecedent and consequent is determined by Kant's ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱ -ȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȱ¡-ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĜȱǻȱ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱ řŗŖǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ to accept in order to decide that something happens. For this reason, ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ ¢Ǽȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ an event dependent on the necessity and strict universality of the em-ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ and only if a rule is determined by an ȱȱǰȱȱȱę¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ ŗś . ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ Hume's conception of causal rules is equal to a general standpoint that he is going to challenge. That standpoint would say that a causal rule -that is, a rule in accordance with which a type of occurrence always follows another type of occurrence -may be discovered if and only if one is able to perceive and compare preceding sequences of occurrences. Moreover, according to Kant, it is usual to believe that the concept of cause itself is formed through that empirical operation of discovering such rules. Thus, Kant concludes, the principle of "every-event-some-cause" would be merely empirical or grounded only on induction, therefore, it would not have true universal validity, what Kant conceives as the distinctive ȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱ ǰȱŗşşŞǰȱǯȱřŖŞǼǯȱ's account of his ȱȱǱȱǼȱ'ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ and apparently accepted in the Prussia of Kant's time 16 ǲȱǼȱ's answer to his question concerning the principle of "every-event-some-cause" was ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱǼȱȱ-ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ's proposal was that the concept of causality and its general principle should be dismissed, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ of causality itself being an empirical concept formed by a second order 15 Graciela de Pierris and Michael Friedman do a great job of explaining the relation between a priori concepts and the strict universality of judgments of experience in "Kant and Hume on Causality", section 2. At times Kant speaks as if it was impossible to attribute strict universality to any type of empirical judgment (see KANT, 1998, p. 137) . Nonetheless, Kant's considered position seems to be that an empirical judgment must be subsumed under an a priori law in order to receive strict universality. Otherwise, empirical causal rules could not express the necessary connection (and thus the strict universality) that, according to Kant, is essential to causality. 16 What suggests that Kant, who was not a good reader in English, would be able to know the major theses of the Treatise before a German translation, what was really missing when Kant worked in Critique of Pure Reason.
induction if we assume that, according to Kant and Hume, a cause is an event from what another event ¢ follows ŗŝ ǯȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱ can provide information about a limited number of cases of sequences between events, from an empiricist point of view, a causal rule would ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ , ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ ments about the existence of events.
This being so, Kant needs to say that causality is an ȱ concept, i. e., a concept that holds for the experience of every event, because then, given any event, it is possible conclude that there is another ȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ-vide that a certain event has been observed to be the case always that another event has been observed to be the case too. It amounts to say that, from a Kantian point of view, since one is able to subsume empirical rules under ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ "B is the case always that A is the case"ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱę¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ "B is the case always that A is the case" is read as a necessary and strictly universal rule then, given a minor premise asserting that "A is the case", one is able to deduce that "B must be the case" (what Kant calls "material necessity"Ǽǰȱǰȱ"B is the case" 18 ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ E in t 1 and state F in t 2 , that syllogism allows us to conclude that the ȱ Ȧ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǯȱǯǰȱȱȱȱ Ȧ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ
On the other hand, if "B is the case always that A is the case" is read ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ"B has been observed to be the case always that A has been observed to be the case"ȱǻȱ¢ȱȱǼǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ"A is the case", one is able to deduce only that "B may be the case". Hence, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ȧ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ is why, according to Kant, every event should have some cause so that cause is an ȱ ȱ Ǳȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ "B (E in t 1 and F in t 2 Ǽȱȱȱ" should stand under a necessary and strictly universal rule. To sum up, if there is an assumption of a cause, one would be able to decide that a succession is an event, because that ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĴ¢ȱȱȱȱ's theory upside down. After all, according to Hume's doctrine of causal inference, ȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼǰȱȱ-ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ that tells us more than we can observe in events, while, according to Kant'ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ we can apply necessary and strictly universal rules based on an ȱ concept of causation. In fact, the pure concept of cause is the ground of ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǯ
